The levels of civic engagement in terms of social services and civic activism in the different Catholic churches of Hong Kong, Macau, Taipei, and Shanghai are very different. While the former three churches have a higher level of social services, Shanghai does not. While Hong Kong has a higher level of civic activism, the other three dioceses do not. This paper explains the similarities and differences among these cities by using an analytical model of political, cultural, and individual opportunity structures. Our findings and analysis are derived from a collaborative research project on the Catholic Church's civic engagement in the four cities using both quantitative and qualitative research methods. In a time of rapid political, economic, and social transformations in China, religion is beginning to play an increasingly important role. Our study will shed light on what roles Catholicism or other religions might play in this process, and it has important implications for church-state relations in greater China.
Macau, Taipei, and Shanghai. The extent to which each place enjoys religious freedom may help us understand why the level of social services and civic activism is low in Shanghai, but it does not help us understand why the level of civic activism is lower in Macau and Taipei than in Hong Kong since they all enjoy full religious freedom. We find that the factors that influence the different levels of social services and civic engagement are a combination of political, cultural, and individual opportunities and choices. This poses a challenge to the religious market theory and calls for an integrative model of analysis that encompasses not only political but also cultural and individual factors.
In the following pages, we will first review other scholars' assessment of the Catholic Church's civic engagement, and some theoretical premises of the sociology of religion and social movements that might explain our data. Informed by these theories, we present an analytical model of our own, which we describe as an integrative model of political, cultural, and individual opportunity structures. Then we introduce our methods of research, followed by our findings and a discussion.
In a time of rapid political, economic, and social transformations in China, religion is beginning to play an increasingly important role. Our study not only shed light on what roles Catholicism or other religions might play in this process, it also has important implications for the church-state relations in China.
Toward an Integrative Model of Political, Cultural, and Individual Opportunity Structures
There is evidence showing a lack of civic engagement by the Catholic Church both in China and in the US (Disalvo 2008:438-39; Madsen 1998 Madsen , 2003 . But other research finds that there might not be much difference between the Catholic civic engagement and that of other religious groups in, for example, the US (Lichterman 2007:523) . In fact, the Catholic Church was at the vanguard of the global human rights revolution in the "third wave of democratization" from the mid-1970s to the 1990s. Furthermore, " [t] he church has remained one of the public voices left still questioning capitalist globalization and demanding the humanization and moralization of market economies and more just and fair international division of labour and distribution of world resources" (Casanova 2001a:433, and 2001b) .
The church was used to nourish and protect civil society spaces, as in the Franco's Spain and Communist Poland (Casonova 2001b) . In Latin America, Catholicism is one of the networks which the poor may access. And nuns, laypersons and clergy "have participated in different processes of social integration leading to nation building and modernization of state and society" (Romero 2001:482, 485) . In Brazil, for example, a central role for the church and for lay organizations with close ties to the church is the defence of human rights. Cardinal Evaristo Arns took a stand against the government following the torture and death of Vladimir Herzog, a prominent Jewish journalist, in 1975 , and the Catholic Church was a major factor in the wave of democratization in the late twentieth century and also helped to improve the conditions of persons in prisons (Cleary 1997) . Likewise, the Catholic Church in Hong Kong has also played a very important role in its democratization, although it is a different matter in other dioceses in greater China.
Various reasons have been given as to why different Catholic dioceses seem to have different levels of civic engagement. These include differences in denominational cultures, standard forms of liturgy, parish governance, and internal parish cultures (Cleary 1997:438-39) . When explaining the Chinese Catholic Church's lack of civic engagement, Madsen thinks that it is mainly due to the Chinese Catholic culture, which is similar to that of the Italian Catholic Church as Putnam observed: it "still retains much of the heritage of the Counter Reformation, including an emphasis on the ecclesiastical hierarchy and the traditional virtues of obedience and acceptance of one's station in life," which is "negatively correlated with civic engagement" (Madsen 1998:135) . Elsewhere, though, Madsen also mentions other factors: interference by the Chinese Religious Affairs Bureaus with the affairs of the Church, and the role of bishops, clergy, and laity, although he does not dwell on them (Madsen 1998:23, 49, 73, 142-45) . These two factors are what we call political and individual factors, in addition to the cultural factor above. We will examine some specific premises of the sociology of religion and social movements below and see how they may inform our own model of analysis based on these three factors.
The Sociology of Religion: The Religious Market, Culture, and the Role of Church
Leaders and Laity
On the basis of the rational choice tradition in social sciences, the religious market theory posits that the structure of a religious market, specifically the level of its pluralism or openness to competition among religious organizations, determines religious behaviors such as church attendance and participation (Stark and McCann 1993) . While in most studies the focus has been placed on the market determinants of religious commitment, with the overarching purpose of providing theoretical and empirical refutations of secularization theory (Chaves and Gorski 2001; Stark and Bainbridge 1985; Stark and Finke 2000) , the religious market theory has also been extended to the analysis of secular and social involvement of religious believers in activities such as giving and volunteering. The results are generally supportive of a positive correlation between religious pluralism and volunteering (Borgonovi 2008) , which accords well with the longstanding intellectual account and popular image of religious, voluntary associations as a major player in the civic life of America (Bellah 1992; de Tocqueville 2004; Wilson and Janoski 1995; Wuthnow 2004) .
Following the religious market model , Yang Fenggang (2006) suggests that the heavy regulation of religion by the soft-authoritarian state in China produces a differentiated and tripartite market situation for religious actors therein. The implication of Yang's triple-market theory is that the level of state regulation should be taken as an independent variable that shapes the structure of the religious market and hence religious behaviors (See also Finke 1990; Chaves and Cann 1992) . As Szonyi (2009:315) points out, "State repression of heterodox groups limits their market, but state repression of institutional religion may paradoxically serve to expand it, since non-institutionalized groups are better able to accommodate state pressure." This has indeed been the case in mainland China.
The religious market theory thus is useful in helping us explain the Catholic Church's civic engagement by pointing out two important factors: religious regulation and competition.
We can hypothesize that the higher the level of religious pluralism and the lower the level of religious regulation, the higher the level of civic engagement by the Catholic Church.
Religious pluralism and state regulation are treated as independent variables. However, we believe that in addition to religious competition and state regulation, other factors are playing a role as well in civic engagement, namely culture and the role of bishops and laity.
"Culture" in our study refers to Chinese culture, local culture and the Catholic culture. As we mentioned above, culture has already been used in the study of the differences between religious groups regarding their civic engagement. For more examples, both Pattillo-McCoy ( 1998:768-69) and Barnes (2005:968) have studied how the black church and its Christian teachings and rituals have fostered its members' civic engagement. They both cited Swidler's (1986) definition of culture: the "symbolic vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies, as well as informal cultural practices and rituals of daily life." These constitute the "tool kit," or cultural repertoire of rituals, stories, symbols, and beliefs, that can be used for social and civic mobilisation. The Bible, spirituals, gospel music, prayer and sermons, the values of freedom and justice and beliefs in their realization, Black
Liberation Theology, have all been effective tools for the mobilization of the Church members for social services and civic activities and for the liberalization of the Black poor.
After all, the church also has a tradition of prophetic role in addition to the priestly and kingly roles (see Weber 1978:426, 439-44 , for more discussion on the priestly role in the operation of a "cultic enterprise," and a prophetic role as a teacher of social ethics, justice and reform based on divine commandment).
The Catholicism that has been implanted in China since the sixteenth century is part of a Counter Reformation missionary movement, as we mentioned earlier. One of its main features is the hierarchical structure of the Church, and it meshes well with the Chinese culture's emphasis on imperial hierarchy (Madsen 1998:29) . The moral demands of the Catholic Church are also consistent with classical Confucian authoritarian, hierarchical, and paternalistic virtues, including being a good person and doing good deeds (Madsen 1998:77-78, 110, 136; Madsen 2003 (Mariani 2011:110, 156 ).
Most of the time, however, the decisions by the bishops and clergy were not a matter of life and death, but rather of more or less civic engagement. In their study of leadership styles of the Catholic leaders of two dioceses in the United States, Harper and Schulte-Murray (1998) point out how bishops can create either a tightly or loosely coupled system in the Church. In the former system, the Archbishop personally controls and shapes energy, information, and policy flows, giving clergy few incentives or rewards for making social activism, while in the latter system, the bishop is more permissive and different elements in the system are more capable of autonomous action, with he himself being outspoken on gender and racial inequalities (Harper and Schulte-Murray 1998:103, 107) . The deacons and priests in the former system are more conservative in socioreligious attitudes, emphasizing liturgy and parish programs, while the deacons and priests in the latter system are more liberal, emphasizing not only these, but also "charitable work, political action, preaching, and witnessing marriages and funerals" (Harper and Schulte-Murray (1998:109 (Ecklund 2006) . Priests are the gatekeepers for the parish culture.
Apparently, the role of the leaders of the Church can never be overemphasized. We hypothesize that one of the major factors influencing civic engagement in the four areas of greater China is the difference in leadership styles. We will, however, also discuss the role of the laity. Together they constitute the individual factor. As we mentioned above, other two major factors are political and cultural. In the following section, we will discuss the political opportunity structure theory and our integrative-analytical model.
Social Movement Theories and an Integrative Model of Analysis
One of the major theories in social movement inquiry is the concept of political opportunity structure. Although scholars have defined the concept differently and applied it to different empirical phenomena, they mostly agree to the following four dimensions: "1) The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; 2) The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; 3) The presence or absence of elite allies; and 4) The state's capacity and propensity for repression" (McAdam 1996:27) .
In our analysis of the Catholic Church's civic engagement, we will find that the four cities of high. As we hypothesized in the section on the sociology of religion, the varying degrees of state control over religion, as is now demonstrated in the structure of political opportunities, will greatly influence the Catholic Church's civic engagement.
But we believe that the structure of political opportunities is only one of the structures. So we propose to add cultural and individual structures, as we discussed in the previous section. The analytical model we propose is the political, cultural and individual opportunity structures (See Figure 1) . X1, X2, and X3 represent the sociological context, which is characterized by the extent to which the political and cultural systems are open or closed, and how individuals (priests and lay Catholics) are affected by and affecting such systems. And it is a dynamic milieu that provides the limits and possibilities of civic engagement, which are the result of negotiation between various social agents and these systems. While the political opportunity structure is composed of four dimensions we discussed above, the cultural opportunity structure would include the tools that are provided by the in different circumstances" (de Vries and Miller 1986:266) . He or she will thus behave accordingly. In other words, the Catholic Church's civic engagement is dependent on the interaction of all these political, cultural, and individual variables. It is this interaction among the structural, cultural, and individual factors that affects the extent to which the Catholic Church engages in social services and civic activism.
Our Research Design
In order to understand the Catholic Church's civic engagement in the four cities of greater China and test our hypothesis of the factors that influence their civic engagement, we did both quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews. Our intention was to survey all the parishes and church-related organizations. But as it turned out, not all of them were willing to accept our invitation to participate in the survey.
And not all of them could be found as in Shanghai. We ended up surveying 34 percent to 88 percent of all parishes, and 9 percent of churches and church-related organizations combined in Hong Kong, and 32 to 50 percent of them in the other dioceses. It is reasonable to assume that those churches that were resistant to our invitation to participate in the study tend to be more conservative. So our research findings may be interpreted as more optimistic than in reality in regard to the church's social services and civic activism than the actual state of affairs justifies. Conversely, in jurisdictions with higher response rate, as in Taipei, reality may be less pessimistic as it appears. We had two questionnaires: one for churches and the other for church-related organizations. Most of the questions are the same. In the questionnaires, we asked over 30
questions that cover about 100 variables. The most important variables are the extent of their civic engagement, which is our dependent variable, and factors that influence the dependent variable, including state regulations of religious activities, the culture of the local Church, and the role of the bishop and clergy. Furthermore, we did 49 in-depth interviews of bishops, priests, nuns, and laity, 10 or more in each city, but mostly priests. In addition to the questions above, we also asked about other factors that influence the Church's civic engagement, such as the role of the Chinese culture, local culture, and laity.
There are two more points we want to emphasize. First, both the interviewees and respondents to our surveys tend to be church leaders and are thus representing the behavior of their church and of priests, which does not reflect participation on the mass level, like individual church attendance or volunteering. Second, as we mentioned earlier, the four jurisdictions under study are of different political systems, ranging from authoritarianism (mainland China) to semi-democracies (Hong Kong and Macau) and a full democracy (Taiwan). So when we talk about political structures or contexts, or social service and civic activism, we need to have those differences and constraints in mind. In the section below, we will discuss both quantitative and qualitative findings.
Findings and Discussion
The Catholic Church's Civic Engagement
In our questionnaires, we asked whether the church or the church-related organizations had in the past year organized or participated in the following activities: (1) advocated the Church's social teachings; (2) questioned or challenged public policy (meaning civic activism); and (3) provided social services. Our research finds that the differences in social services provision among the four dioceses are small (96.5 percent in Hong Kong, 78.9 percent in Macau, 74.5 percent in Taipei Table 2 , items in the order of questions asked.)
We hypothesized that according to the religious market theory, looser state regulation and more religious competition or pluralism would positively affect the amount of social services and civic activism while stricter government regulation and lack of pluralism would negatively affect it. Our findings regarding government regulation (items 1 and 4 in Table 2) indicate that the results are mixed. First of all, it is inconclusive whether government regulation (item 1 in Table 2 ) is looser or stricter in the four areas of greater China. Take
Hong Kong for example. While 50 percent of the respondents say no change, 37 percent of them say religious regulations are stricter, the highest percentage of respondents to say so in the four dioceses. It is hard to say whether this goes against the religious market theory's assumption that the stricter the religious regulation, the less active the civic engagement, since it is not always clear what they meant by stricter or looser. It is a matter of perception.
But at least on the surface, it seems that in Hong Kong it may be that the stricter the state regulation, the more active the civic engagement. The Shanghai statistics are also interesting.
Close to 45.8 percent say the state regulation is looser, highest percentage among the four dioceses, yet the Church's civic engagement is still very low. In fact, Hong Kong and Shanghai have similar perceptions of stricter religious regulation, 37.0% vs. 33.3%, yet civic activism is higher in the former than the latter. Should not they be similar? This is understandable, however, because civic activism also has to do with state potential for repression. It is lower in Hong Kong than in Shanghai, hence the differences. If state regulation is very different, we should see great differences in social services. But we do not see this reflected in the percentages, although we do know that the actual number of social services in Shanghai is much smaller, as reflected in the number of church-related organizations, which is in accordance with the religious market theory, again an issue of state potential for repression rather than one's perception of religious restrictions. Respondents' perceptions can often be questionable. It is possible that the respondents in some cities may be exaggerating the severity of state regulation. It is also possible that their perception is based in fact. Thus we need to check their perceptions with reality whenever possible.
The statistics on religious competition or pluralism do not appear to support the religious market premise, either, but again this may be because of the inherent problems of respondents'
perceptions rather than a problem with the religious market theory. From 63.6 percent to 70.6 percent of respondents say that there is more harmony between religions (item 2 in Table 2 ), and over 80% of the respondents in the four dioceses say that either fewer, or no Catholics are converting to other religions, or not that they know of (item 3 in Table 2 ). Yet, the differences in civic activism are great, as we reported earlier. So it is not clear to what extent pluralism or competition plays a role in civic engagement. But again harmony or competition is mainly a matter of interpretation, and it compromises our judgment on this issue.
But if we look at item 4 in Table 2 , the religious market premise does help us understand the church's participation in civic activism, although not much in social services. That is, the stark contrast between Hong Kong, a semi-democracy, and Shanghai, under an authoritarian regime, about participation in civic activism (47.4 percent vs. 7.8 percent in Figure 2 ) can be explained by the stark contrast between the two cities in their respective heeding of the government officials' opinion when organizing or participating in an activity: Hong Kong's 5.6 percent vs. Shanghai's 69.6 percent. We can thus infer that the higher the state regulation, the less civic activism, and vice versa. See Table 3 .
The difference between Hong Kong and Taipei, however, needs further explanation. Both have religious freedom and low levels of government regulation, but the latter's level of civic engagement is much lower than the former's even though it is a full democracy. In addition, even if the state control differs greatly in the four dioceses, their perception of social services is similar, although we do know that the actual number of services in Shanghai is indeed smaller which can partly be explained by the strict state control. So our conclusion is that our hypothesis regarding state regulation only partially explains the extent to which the Catholic Church engages in social services and civic activity. There are other factors. government opinions (an indicator of government regulation) when they initiate or participate in an action, and the extent to which this factor correlates with the percentages reflecting their civic engagement (social services and civic activism). An examination of the numbers indicates that while the difference among the four jurisdictions in social service provision is small, except in the case of Hong Kong, the difference in civic activism is significant, especially between Hong Kong and Shanghai. The less notice respondents take of government opinion, or the less government regulation, the more civic activism there is, and vice versa.
The Cultural Factor
As we hypothesized earlier, culture influences civic engagement of the Catholic Church. By culture, we mean Chinese culture, local culture, and the Catholic culture. Due to the limits of our survey research, we rely mainly on qualitative data for an explanation of the Chinese and Local culture, however, does not seem to have much influence on the Taipei Diocese: the local civil society is very active, yet the Church is not, except in social services. From the 1970s to 1990s when civil society movements in Taiwan were on the rise, some in the Catholic Church were strongly against the Catholic involvement in them. So the Church has never been fully in step with the development of civil society in Taiwan. Again the role of the Church leaders, which we will discuss in the next section, is apparently more important.
In our quantitative research, we examined especially the effect of the Catholic culture on civic engagement. All Catholic lay men and women are supposed to share Jesus' three-fold ministry of Priest, King and Prophet, that is, they have a mission to sanctify, to govern and to teach. The priestly role is to participate and cooperate in the Sacramental mission of the church. The kingly role is to serve the people in Jesus's kingdom; therefore, the ministry of the King is also understood as that of the King-Servant. The prophetic role is carried out both in the church and community, where a prophet is also understood as an advocate of social justice in society today (Weinandy 2006; Weber 1978:424-51) . In our surveys, we asked whether their organization thinks it is appropriate for them to air their views on democratization, i.e., their prophetic role. Figure 3 is our findings. We see that although a lower percentage of respondents in Shanghai, Taipei and Macau felt that it is appropriate to air their views on democratization (from 51 percent to 63 percent), they are not very low. Yet, there is a big difference between Hong Kong (93 percent) and other cities. We view this as an indication of the Church's prophetic role. Will this affect their civic activism? Table 4 shows that it does. The higher the belief in the prophetic role, the higher the extent of civic activism (as reported in Figure 2 ) and vice versa. NOTE: The "value percentages" in the table refer to the percent of churches and church-related organizations that believe in the appropriateness of airing their views on democratization, i.e., the belief in the prophetic role.
When this factor is correlated with their perception of participation in civic activism (see Figure 2) , we see that the higher the belief in the prophetic role, the higher the level of civic activism, and vice versa.
This belief in and role of the prophet is very weak in Macau. Our interviewees believe that the Church has an obligation to improve society, but it is not necessary to criticize the government to achieve that goal. One priest took an active part in environmental issues in Macau but he said that he did so mainly to protect the health of the youths in the Catholic hostel he was in charge of (Macau Interview #3 factor is only one of the three major factors we are dealing with. As in the case of Shanghai, the culture may require them to engage in more social service and civic activity, but the state apparently does not want them to. And even if the state allows opportunities for social services and civic activism, church leaders may not want to engage in these activities, especially in civic activism. This leads us to the next question on the individual factor.
The Individual Factor
We hypothesized that the role of the bishops, clergy, and laity is yet another important factor in influencing the Church's civic engagement. In our questionnaires, we asked the respondents to tell us, on a Likert Scale, to what extent the current and previous bishops believed in the political engagement of the Church (with 1 as "not very important," 2 as "not important," 3 as "important," and 4 as "very important"). There were no significant differences in Macau (2.2 vs. 2.7), Taipei (2.5 vs. 2.3), and Shanghai (2.6 vs. 2.5), but there was a significant difference in the Hong Kong diocese, 2.4 vs. 3.6 (see Figure 4) .
We mentioned at the beginning of this paper Bishop Zen's protest at the Central Government's Liaison Office. Indeed, he was instrumental in the 2003 movement against the legislation of Article 23. Unlike the bishops before him and the current bishop, Zen was a more activist bishop who would call on his followers to take to the street to protest inequality. This is very similar to the differences between the two bishops in the two dioceses in the US whom we discussed earlier.
If the role of the bishops is important, so is the role of other clergy. Our interviewees in Hong Kong also mentioned several clergy who were active in civic engagement, such as Fr.
Stephen Our interviewees in Taipei are critical of the bishops for their lack of civic activism, too.
As one of them commented, Around the time of the lifting of martial law, the Bishops Council wrote us a letter calling on believers not to take to the street to create trouble. They wanted us foreign Catholic orders to sign the letter. I was so unhappy that I said bad words about the bishop. A Swedish priest said to me that it was their country's affairs, and we foreigners should not interfere….
The previous bishop used to pay lip service to social justice, saying, "Good, good. I support you and will pray for you. There is some change in the Diocese of Taipei but it is still not used to criticizing the government. The situation is the same in Shanghai. As one of our interviewees says:
The Catholic Church is a well-organized religious organization with relatively strong disciplines. Usually the priests and nuns will keep pace with the Bishop, and the laity will keep pace with the priests. The laity usually will not go their own way in civic engagement. In social services and civic activism, the majority of the laity will follow the In the literature review, we also mentioned the importance of laity. We know that lay But this is not true with the Macau and Taipei dioceses. They have all these tools, too, but they choose not to use them much. For the Shanghai Diocese, state control seems too tight for church members to use the cultural tools they possess for either social services or civic activism, but it does not mean that they have no opportunities for services and activism at all.
The cultural factor helps us understand to a great extent the civic engagement of these dioceses. But there is more. Finally, we want to emphasize the importance of interaction between the three opportunity structures. Political structure is undergirded by culture, and they reinforce one another. For example, traditional Chinese culture is more likely to support an authoritarian state. But since culture is becoming more diversified and modernized, political structure ceases to be a solid mass. It is also beginning to change. Chan and Zhou (2013) , for example, discuss "fragmented authoritarianism" and discrepancies between the image of a coherent state and the actual practices of its multiple parts. The authoritarian state may move toward democratization, as in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, even in mainland China. A more open political opportunity structure also influences the cultural opportunity structure, providing more tools for civil society organizations to choose from. This means that civic engagement by the Catholic Church is in flux, and can increase or decrease based on the changing nature of the political and cultural opportunities.
Furthermore, Individuals are no doubt influenced by these opportunity structures, but they also play a part in changing them. Bishops Zen and Ma are obviously trying to change these opportunities. Other bishops, clergy and laity are also playing a part in this, whether it is an active or passive part, they are nonetheless involved. Even in Shanghai, there might be more possibilities for social services and civic activism than the Church thinks. That is the dynamic we want to capture in our analytical model of political, cultural, and individual opportunity structures.
To sum up, in this paper, we reviewed the literature on the sociology of religion and social movements that informed our model of analysis and explained our methods of research. We then reported our findings from a research project on the Catholic Church's civic engagement as defined by social services and civic activism in the four dioceses of Hong Kong, Macau, Taipei, and Shanghai. We found that Hong Kong, Macau, and Taipei dioceses have been outstanding in their social services, but Shanghai is lacking. Hong Kong is outstanding in civic activism as well, but the other three dioceses are lacking. We found that it is difficult to explain the phenomena by using only one theory, either the religious market theory, or a social movement theory. So we used an integrative model of analysis: the political, cultural, and individual opportunity structures. No single factor in this model can explain the differences among the four dioceses. It is the combination of these factors that can help us explain the phenomenon to a great extent.
We believe that our analytical model has raised some interesting premises. We hope that more research will be done in the future to use the same model to further understand not only the relationship between Catholicism and civil society but also the relationship between other religions and civil society by using the same model. It should be both quantitative and qualitative, and historical and comparative not only between areas in greater China but between China and other countries of the world. This should shed light not only on the sociology of religion, but on social movement theories as well.
